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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Recent discourse on corporate governance undermines the assertion that corporations ought 
to function purely in the interests of all stakeholders, rather than for the sake of controlling 
shareholders. But if the terms of stakeholders are taken to include all participants engaging in 
large firm-specific investments, then we can trace the real essence of governance as an 
appropriate basis for reform. Far from erasing the idea that firms should operate and be 
controlled by stakeholder categories, this should not only be for the interests of institutional 
investors, employees, suppliers and customers. New systems need to be devised that assign 
rights, responsibilities, and rewards to stakeholders who provide specialized inputs to the 
firm. Emphases on the contribution of employees in foreseeing a sustainable period of 
productivity is key if the most appropriate form of corporate governance is to be recognised. 
Yet, the crucial question remains as to the key qualities discernible from near-perfect models 
of corporate governance. Governance mechanisms and contractual arrangements remain to be 
intermittently formed, allotting functions to stakeholder participants. It would be apt for 
scholars to provide rationales for their arguments in favour of wholly owned employee 
corporations and cooperatives; however such cases seldom exist.   
 
Obsolete arguments pertaining to the sole purpose of corporate governance in facilitating 
shareholder wealth maximization are impractical here. Its acceptance merits further 
consideration for other players, each of whom play a significant role in realising and fulfilling 
strategic objectives. Further, if theory establishes convincingly that employee ownership is an 
inefficient organizational form, then the reasons for other forms of organization must be 
explored more fully. A growing practice allows employees to cement their presence in the 
workplace as stockholders, thereby awarding concessions for equity stakes in firms. This 
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interpretation caters for the need to demonstrate employee influence through defined benefit 
and stock ownership plans. Employees who gain ownership positions through other forms of 
compensation have typically been unable to secure equal access to the boardroom. 
 
As groups become majority owners, the actual governance of the corporation may depend, in 
part, on how employees assume this position in the first place. Some transferences of equity-
for-wages, notably seen in the airline, steel and trucking industries, pose concerns for 
employee representation in unions and governing boards. Employees do not only have 
unequal board representation when compared to their equity stake, they also cannot control 
the votes held in their interests, nor facilitate tenders surrounding takeover bids. Alternative 
mechanisms for voting stockholding shares, such as plans for “mirror voting” will in these 
cases be deployed. On the other hand, existing concepts of firm-specific investments are an 
insufficient means of justifying property rights. Some corporations will not function in the 
same manner as others, and may be less able to endorse firm-specific options. Stockholding 
groups that have an exemplary knowledge of day-to-day operations of the business will have 
a close involvement in ascertaining the most appropriate means of governance.  
 
Companies owned by employees exemplify governance structures that delegate power to 
employees. However, some schools of thought argue that employee practices highlighted in 
multifunctional firms are inefficient, due to the reason that employees, as internal 
stakeholders, are unable to effectively maintain physical capital, for example through sole 
proprietorship. If employees are assigned majority ownership and control of the firm, the 
question posed should concern their place within the modern corporation. 
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The opposition of unions to employee ownership arises, in part, from their legitimate 
concerns on the negative risks imposed on workers. Inherent in the ownership debate lies the 
problem of excessive risk posed by pension plans. For example, the value of employee 
savings is increasingly linked to the future performance of the operating company; as 
opposed to proportional measures of their individual performance contribution.  Worker 
autonomy has been seen as a means through which collective bargaining is undermined, and 
the evolving institution levelled by industrial unions has posed as a significant forum for 
discussion. The organizational barriers between trade institutions can also be seen as 
problematic.  
 
Employee participation is also under threat as a complementary feature to management 
strategic positioning practices. Here, participation refers to initiatives employed by the state, 
highlighting the collective rights of employees seeking involvement in key decision-making, 
as well as efforts to reach full representation, deriding employer resistance. The examination 
of employee involvement in this discussion refers to the practices emanating from senior 
management and promoters of free market activity. Proponents claim this as providing 
employees with significant opportunities to interact and voice their dissatisfaction with the 
status quo. Vital for a keeping of employee voice and control, structures need to be firm, 
allowing regular exchanges of information through greater transparency and consultation. 
Measures of transparency and accountability forwarded by employees will need to deliver a 
strong outcome for the corporation. 
 
Distinctions need to be made between arguments and models that seek to define the employee 
as separate from upper management and directors, as well as models seeking to accord 
control to those in a more dynamic fashion. A noted example of the preliminary model moves 
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away from a purely contractual interpretation of the employment relationship, one that can be 
clearly discerned through freedoms of contract, to a more defined relationship allowing 
employees to gain, inter alia, a degree of job security that is enshrined by common law. In a 
market that is uncharacterised by perfect elasticity, employees have specialized skills to bring 
to the boardroom, which can be rewarded through pure corporate governance structures. Yet 
employees are expected to be continually instructed by management and be competent in 
promoting the company’s mission, once put into practice. Where employees form means to a 
justified end, participation in decisions is key. Such corporate governance policies will lead 
to productive relationships between company and worker. Suppliers, as key stakeholders, are 
essential to the operations of the firm, as the raw materials supplied inevitably determine the 
outcome of the finished product. A similarity discerned occurs when they are valued as a 
reputable participant within the stakeholder network, as opposed to functional controller. 
Responding when the firm is at risk, the interaction of stakeholders and the board is crucial in 
reducing exposure.  
 
Until recently, this approach did little to restrict corporate activity. However, subsequent 
crises altered legal precedent once the global ownership of stockholder interests was 
assumed. These changes arose at the expense of other claimants of the firm operating within 
the corporate governance framework. This, in effect, mandated that the claims of 
stakeholders be taken into full consideration and no longer be subordinated to stockholders.  
 
Although stockholder rights are not regarded by the board of directors as the defining feature 
of corporate governance, they have the added advantage of protecting employee shareholding 
groups from managerial opportunism once formal agreements have been reached.  An 
example in question is the claim that productivity concessions enhance the economic viability 
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of the firm. The possibility might also arise where a manager attempts to extract further 
concessions. Such participation rights in governance help to address employee concerns that 
management enters into transactions for the sake of opportunism, rather than for the 
collective good of the firm. The regime of employment rights is emerging in academic 
discourse, particularly that on the importance of collective bargaining. Concerns were 
formerly voiced on the “old” system of collective bargaining, where workplace rules could be 
tailored to the specificity of each category of employers, and latterly changed in negotiations 
as a form of dissent within the corporate environment.  The “new” employment system 
involves employment rights that are applied throughout organizations that can only be 
adjusted through lengthy bureaucratic and legal processes.  Political demand, of course, has a 
major influence on managerial procedures. Managing an environment subject to cross-border 
regulations calls for a considered response within academic circles. 
 
Modern interpretations of corporate governance place less emphasis on questions relating to 
the structure and functioning of the board and lesser participants. Rather, emphasis is given to 
the rights and prerogatives of stakeholders whose interests may not be represented as much. 
In this discussion, we adopt a broader view of corporate practices to refer to a holistic view of 
legal, institutional and cultural arrangements, particularly in determining the control of 
publicly traded corporations. The allocation of risks and returns amongst stakeholders stem 
largely from the activities they undertake.  This debate has been extended, to include 
demands for participatory rights and whether employees, as stakeholders, ought to be 
embraced to a fuller extent. Including investors other than shareholders in the modern 
corporation, the stakeholders form a central part of the place in which they are assigned to 
function. The onus placed on shareholders, as an esteemed stakeholding group that creates 
successful corporate governance practice, must be framed around discussions on the 
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importance of individual behaviour. Neither the stakeholder models nor those underlying the 
modern private system have been fully developed. We seek to consolidate prevailing 
perspectives on the role of stakeholders in the corporation, with intrinsic focus placed on 
employees as functional participants. If the view emerges that employees should play an 
integral role in the mechanism of corporate governance practices, then it is from the model of 
stakeholder involvement that solid arguments must proceed. References to managerial 
employees also remain relevant here. Despite the prevalence of power struggles amongst 
stakeholders, allegations that international law supports this, is justifiable, if not 
controversial. The corporation is subsequently viewed as a “nexus of contracts”, of which 
each assumes to satisfy the legitimate concerns of engaging parties.1 The system can be 
understood as having assigned the same level of rights to stakeholders as the members of the 
governing board.  The leveraging of power over workers is identifiable amongst managerial 
employees, in altering the performance of the firm, and at times conflicts with stakeholder 
integration.  In Anglo-American models, this is underpinned by shared identity problems, 
raising concerns in the international field. 
 
Fiduciary duties forwarded by legal scholars present a sound justification for the equitable 
rights of employees. However, a limitation emerges where justifications of fiduciary ties 
bestowed to employees, are articulated but not subsequently enforced. The assumption that 
shareholders vote accurately on the performance of management, can be applied to a 
unionized workforce, one that is aided by collective organization and prevents reprisal from 
management. 
 
                                                          
1 Bratton Jr., W. W., 1990. The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporatoin: A Critical Appraisal. Cornell Law Review , 
74(19), pp. 407-440. 
 
Candidate Number: F1015 
9 
 
This study will provide an alternative reading of modern mechanisms of corporate 
governance and ethics as one that needs to more fully integrate employees as key 
stakeholders. Through an enhanced understanding of corporate governance research, 
corporate law and international regulation, these disciplines serve to complement our 
positioning of corporate governance within a business environment that is becoming 
increasingly fractious. The methodology will be supplemented by extensive searches of 
published material, consisting of peer-reviewed journals, reports, theories, case law, statutes 
and legislation.  The claims of corporate governance professionals are cross-checked against 
measures taken by regulators for their effectiveness. Publicly available sources of information 
have been referenced throughout with an emphasis on research studies carried out prior to 
writing.  All sources were corroborated and referenced for their authenticity in supporting the 
arguments presented in this discussion. Data previously gathered from interviews will be 
placed alongside qualitative studies. Insight will be heavily focused on current trends, nature 
and approaches.  
 
To a large extent, this qualitative analysis will be based on theory, with theoretical 
observations tested against real business practice for their validity. Consideration of 
employees as stakeholders could be presented here as a solution to the agency problem. 
Owing to the dispersed ownership structure of companies, directors may not necessarily take 
care of the interest of the shareholders. Arguments in favour of employees as stockholders are 
likely to balance and reconcile theories on economic efficiency and social justice.  
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Chapter 2: Employee Functioning in the Corporation 
 
Extant scholarship on corporate governance tends to focus on the relationships between 
shareholders and directors or managers. Often neglected in the vast body of dialogue and 
discussion is the functional role of employees in modern corporations. Corporate structures 
across boards will be examined for their consistency in aiding the strength of the employee 
voice, with the practice of codetermination a plausible solution allowing for greater presence 
in the workplace. As stockholders, employees are able to have a material connection with the 
corporate entity, with equity ownership more common than is often realized in debates on 
corporate governance. Typically embodied in the employee, human capital is a crucial source 
of value for organizations, with employees having a formal but relatively un-acclaimed role, 
both as representatives on the board of directors, and as entry-level workers. The findings 
point to a far more plausible solution for workplace imbalances. Alleviated by more advanced 
information flows and greater communication throughout the corporation, organizational 
performance is likely to be enhanced.  
 
I. Board Participation 
 
Employee participation in corporate governance structures is effectively realized through 
board membership. Boards in local jurisdictions are structured to allow employees to voice 
their concerns and welcome improvements to firm performance. Distributing signals to the 
wider corporation employee interests will inevitably feature of primary importance during 
boardroom deliberations. More decisive weight, however, needs to be attached to potential 
conflict with shareholder interests in the private and publicly traded entity.2 Where employee 
directors are appointed to committees, discussion is likely to focus on their rights within the 
                                                          
2 Perotin, V. R., 2004. Employee Participation: Firm Performance and Survival. 1st ed. London: Emerald, p.87 
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organization, as representatives of workers. Employee representatives are likely to assess 
managerial competence, subsequent to ensuring that resources are usefully deployed. In 
countries favouring the establishment of committees as opposed to the traditional board 
structure, employees may be better represented in compensation committees.3 Considering 
the interests of employees has been legally advanced through the passage of the Companies 
Act 2006. The basic requirement that their concerns are highlighted during the internal 
deliberations of the board is a feature of the seminal Act. 4 As Lord Wedderburn posited in 
the final report published in the Company Law Review, directors must identify the material 
interests of stakeholders in order to promote the company as a success for its members.5 
Note, however, that the report did not mention the safeguarding of employee interests per se, 
rather that this should be distinct from the legal relationship of directors to employees. The 
duties by which general directors should be bound are clearly listed. Critiques of §309(2) of 
the preceding Companies Act 1985 advance in favour of employees’ concerns being 
prioritised.6 In reality, §309(2) of the Companies Act 1985 was perceived as being of no 
practical use to employees, with negligible benefits granted.7 The subsequent 2006 Act, 
however, compensated for this shortcoming, giving legally binding guidelines to directors on 
the means of fulfilling company duties, and reflecting the prescribed interests of 
stakeholders.8 These guidelines explicitly cater for greater employee recognition, however, 
the existing law declines interference in substantive business decisions. The requirement that 
employees should be fully incorporated into the firm is considered as largely procedural. The 
                                                          
3 Ibid., p. 219 
4 Companies Act 2006 c. 46 
5Wedderburn, L. A., 2002. Employees, Partnerships and Company Law. International Law Journal, 99(31), pp. 
113-170 
6 § 309(2) , Companies Act 200 
7 Ibid. 
8 Holt, W. B., 1950. Alteration of a Company's Objects and the Ultra Vires Doctrine. Law Quarterly Review, 
66(4), pp. 493-516 
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lack of remedies available for employee exclusion removes the ability to pursue cases when 
they do arise, with the company as the only legal person able to bring forward the claim.9 
 
A further topic on the corporate governance debate relates the distribution of power to 
employee directors. Where boards function by consensus as opposed to the divided vote, the 
allocation of board positions will often determine the consensus decision. Due to concerns 
surrounding financial intermediaries and public shareholders, employees are rarely elected on 
majority, even though they may hold substantial bargaining power as majority shareholder.   
 
By placing elected representatives on boards of company directors, employees are also 
shielded from obligations to place equity investments in the firm. Dow effectively concludes 
his research by referring to this system, most akin to democratic models of governance. By 
opening his arguments with a clear overview in favour of codetermination policies, Dow at 
the same time highlights the few controversies spawned by this model.10 Whilst the concept 
of codetermination is used most broadly to endorse collective bargaining and work councils 
at the ground level, Dow and Svejner limit its scope to mandatory employee representation, a 
feature in Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Norway and Luxembourg dating back to the 1970s.11 
Whilst these countries initiated the practice in the workplace, Germany revived these efforts 
most vigorously. Utilising the theories of Berelli, Lys and Loderer, issues other than the 
gaining of wealth through the system have been widely explored.12  
                                                          
9 Perotin, op. cit., p. 237 
10 Dow, G., 2002. Governing the Firm: Workers’ Control in Theory and Practice. 4th ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 32 
11 Ibid., p. 193 
12 Bennelli, G., Loderer, C. & T. Lys, 1987. Labour Participation in Corporate Policy. Journal of Business, 
60(9), pp. 87-109. 
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II. Stock Ownership 
 
Employee-owned companies empower employees to enhance the productivity of a firm. 
Theorists have argued that this mode of governance is inefficient.  There is admittedly a lack 
of incentive amongst employees to maintain physical capital in the form of property.13 The 
argument that a more prominent role within corporate governance leads to an inefficient use 
of physical capital stems from a rather restrictive assumption, stating that an employee’s 
stake in the firm is unmarketable and cannot be promoted favourably with ease. If employees 
are able to signal majority ownership in the form of shares and decide to sell whilst still 
salaried, for example, the market price of the shares would relate to the loss in value of the 
physical capital neglected. In the case of shares that are marketable, employees enjoy the 
same incentive to see the property efficiently maintained. The literature follows that 
employees prefer to accumulate net revenues amongst each worker as opposed to purely 
through profit. This preference would result in inefficient use of company resources leading 
to unequal levels of production. The issues at work here, however, need to be analyzed 
separately before an overall judgement can be summarily expressed. Critics including Mark J. 
Roe, in his assertions, do not ascertain prior whether the firm should primarily be classed and 
organized as a corporation, and if so, whether employees ought to control the firm.14 These 
critiques do not accurately apply to the firm if it is presented as a corporate body. In these 
cases, workers hold a significant or wholly owned portion of share capital, with the 
employee-owners at liberty to sell their representation within the company. Stock ownership 
equips employees with voting rights, particularly in matters dealt with through shareholder 
                                                          
13 Copeman, G. H., 1975. Employee Share Ownership and Industrial Stability. 3rd ed. London: Institute of 
Personnel Management., p. 58 
 
14 Roe et. al, op.cit., p. 241 
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votes. Whilst assigning the right to vote is not typically viewed as the most important feature 
of corporate governance, the employee shareholder group is essentially protected from bouts 
of managerial opportunism once agreements have been reached.15 Workers may be 
concerned, for example, that where wage and productivity adjustments enhance the ability of 
the firm to conduct mergers, there will inevitably be cases where further concessions are 
sought. From the employee’s perspective, it will be commonplace for stock ownership 
transactions to be stated in a format that gives employees rights of veto over the deal, even 
though the employees will not have majority ownership of the entity. In order for an effective 
solution to be posed, further insight into governance participation is needed amongst scholars, 
in helping to address employee grievances. Management will, in most cases, sideline 
employees when assuming dominance over transactions. 
 
Equity ownership is more common than is realized in corporate governance debates. In 
studies undertaken by Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi, approximately 1,000 publicly 
traded companies were identified where employees held at least 4% of stock.16 Representing 
an average of 12% of voting shares this was compared against the rate at which ownership of 
equity ascended. Brian Finch predicted in a separate study that ¼ of operating entities would 
be 15% or more owned by employees.17 According to critics, employee ownership will be 
increasingly prevalent over the next two decades, spreading throughout the economy and not 
focused solely on the steel and airline sectors, where equity-for-wage concessionary 
agreements have been well documented. To focus our inquiry, a potent example of stock 
transactions amongst employee participants will be examined. Majority equity acquired in 
United Air Lines, enabled the engaging parties to discern employee ownership as a future 
                                                          
15 Copeman, op. cit., p. 68 
16 Blasi, J. R. & Douglas L. Kruse, 2010. Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain 
Sharing, and Broad-Based Stock Options. 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 192 
17 Finch, Brian Insolvency and Financial Distress: How To Avoid It And Survive It (New York: A&C Black, 
2012), p. 126 
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trend rather than allowing for change in corporate governance techniques.18 The structuring 
of the deal allowed employees to acquire stock through a recognized Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan. Distributing strong rights in employee governance, a central objective of the 
transaction, the restructuring of UAL’s operations to include a low-cost carrier, increased 
efficiency, and changes in compensation packages required a greater level of employee 
cooperation.19  
The evidence highlights the capability of the airlines industry in the US as highly profitable. 
The high expectations in corporate governance standards, however, are potentially 
mismatched with the industry’s attitude towards employees. The case of United Air Lines 
also indicates that fluctuations in wealth can raise problems to a similar magnitude than its 
apparent advantages. Transactions in employee stock ownership do not address the imbalance 
between institutional shareholders and salaried employees. Ordinarily, employees have no 
basis to concede or begin negotiations on equity-for-concessions swaps. Stakeholder gaining 
proprietary positions through Employee Stock Ownership Plans, on the other hand, have not 
accessed the boardroom commensurate with directors. Less than half a percent of all 
companies studied had any form of employee representation drawn from non-senior 
management.20 Out of the minority of firms where employees are taken as majority 
shareholder, substantive representation was a rarity. 
 
III. Codetermination  
 
On the other hand, employee participation in governance structures, whilst aided by the board 
of directors, entails more than simply a balancing function before individuals of notable 
                                                          
18 Monks, R. A. G. & Nell Minnow, 2011. Corporate Governance. 1st ed. Stanford: Wiley, p. 45 
19 Ibid., p. 132 
20 Copeman, op.cit, p. 117 
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authority. The traditional conception of the board can be structured so that information is 
disseminated more widely.21 This lends credibility and value to proceedings whilst 
facilitating the negotiation phase. Employee presence highlights the value of dialogue, in 
raising awareness of ordinary workers, in the hope that their interests will be adequately 
voiced and decisive weight accorded to apparent conflicts of interest. Employees are at an 
advantageous position to mediate the collective authority exercised by management, and the 
motivation of the board to safeguard the influence of public and private shareholders.22 Once 
secure in this position, employees will assume a position of control, evidenced by a more 
collaborative working culture. A central governance question posited by readers in corporate 
governance follows the nature of authority wielded by employees participating in boardroom 
negotiations. The German system of codetermination provides adequate opportunities, 
assigning control rights to workers that are otherwise obsolete in the West.23 Established by 
the Codetermination Act, this allowed the coal and steel industries in the region to profit the 
most favourably.24 Referred to as the Montan sector, firms amongst the least affected class 
were required to have a supervisory board of eleven members, five of whom were chosen by 
employees, with the remaining six chosen by shareholders.25 Amongst employee board 
members, blue- and white-collar workers are represented with separate procedures endorsed 
by board members. The Act effectively extended critics’ version of “near parity” amongst the 
supervisory firm, extending the practice to all limited liability firms falling outside of the 
Montan sector. The initial system, on the other hand, was seen to be endorsing one of “full 
parity” between employees and board members.26  
 
                                                          
21 Ibid., p. 675 
22 Wedderburn, op. cit., p. 120 
23 Fauver, op. cit., p.679 
24 Group, C. L. R. S., 2001. Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report, London: 
Routledge, p. 216 
25 Blair, M. & Roe, M. J., 1999. Employees and Corporate Governance. 2nd ed. Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, p. 180 
26 Ibid. 
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Corporate governance systems in Germany are heavily focused on maintaining employee 
representation on supervisory boards. Where this commonly occurs, such arrangements are 
legally mandated. Employees not only have extensive knowledge of operations at their 
disposal, but their existence on boards lends advanced operational insight to decision-making 
in boards The greater need for cooperation is matched with greater improvements in 
governance. The policy stipulating the rights of employees in contributing to decisions made 
by the board, referred to as the Mitbestimmungsrecht, also known as the Right of 
Codetermination.27 Initially applied to German workers in the coal, steel, and mining 
industries where they assumed 50% representation on company boards, this requirement was 
extended to conglomerates in excess of 2,000 employees.28 Stock corporations, on the other 
hand, with 500 to 2000 employees were required to have 33% representation on their boards. 
The supervisory board chosen by stockholders to promote interests through corporate 
governance, as well its role in the supervision and onboarding of executive directors, 
typically has employee members based on numbers, statutory capital, and the relevant 
codetermination statute. Studies undertaken in this field are usually based on board size 
ranges from eight to thirteen, however our sample generates an average board size of seven. 
Studies investigating the financial benefits of labour representation on corporate boards, 
however, are few to date. The nature of inquiry usually revolves around the enactment of 
legislation defining codetermining rights. Other studies advanced by Gorton and Schmid are 
concerned with the non-economic indicators of performance, for example, a firm’s ability to 
execute decisions and develop employee foresight.29 Tüngler notes a shift from the isolated 
supervisory boards documented by Fischer and Edwards to those concerned with actively 
monitoring firm and management performance.30 Closely matched to the Code of Best 
                                                          
27 Bennelli et. al, op.cit.,  p. 45 
28 Ibid. 
29 Köke,J. Corporate Governance in Germany: An Empirical Investigation. Munich: Springer, 2002, p. 76 
30 Ibid., p. 189 
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Practice published in the UK by the Cadbury Committee, the Deutscher Corporate 
Governance Kodex, was promulgated in 2002 as the German Corporate Governance Code.31 
Raising corporate governance standards, this Code specified corporate obligations for the 
supervisory and management boards. We note the adoption of the German Corporate 
Governance Code as optional, however analyses of annual reports dating from 2002 suggest 
the near universal desire to comply.32 Authors more sceptical as to the widespread effects of 
codes of governance including McConnell, Dahya, and Travlos discover a marked increase in 
firm turnover, directed by management and employees, following the adoption by UK 
firms.33 Likewise, there is an increasingly dominant role of supervisory boards and published 
statements of compliance with the regulations.  
 
An additional yet highly significant type of labour representation appearing in corporate 
governance, is the right of codetermination in work councils. In keeping with these laws, 
councils must be elected by employees, whilst aggregate councils predominate in firms with 
multiple plants. Corporate entities holding over 100 employees on a permanent basis should 
establish a separate business and finance committee, which may also function as a reporting 
mechanism.34 The literature surveyed suggests a strong consensus in favour of 
codetermination, where management and supervisory boards comprising of a concentrated 
employee base should prevail. However, there is an emerging school of thought forwarding a 
more diluted presence of codetermination across Europe. Michael E. Fuerst for example, 
argues that “excessive codetermination” may eventually “force the diminution of supervisory 
                                                          
31 German Corporate Governance Code. Government Commission, May 26, 2010, p. 118 
32 Roe et al., op. cit., p. 221 
33 Dahya, J., McConnell, J. J. & Travlos, N. G., 2002. The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance and Top 
Management Turnover. Journal of Finance, 25 (3), pp. 281-334. 
34 Codetermination Act 1976 
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board power”.35 His assertions counterbalance the findings of progressive scholars. They 
posit that as strong boards tend to attract strong influence from workers to board decisions, 
many firms continue to be family controlled. Thus the family-controlled firms avoid 
compliance with codetermination laws due to exemption, whilst the value of labour is 
summarily reduced. Taking into account the major strands of corporate governance, the 
nature of the supervisory board, concentrated ownership and product competition, a note of 
caution is attached. Whist scholars believe in the merits of the German system of corporate 
governance, others are more prudent, believing that concentrated ownership is effective in 
isolated circumstances only.  
 
IV. Employees as “Human Capital”  
 
The burden of risk associated with poor investments can potentially lie with employees, 
especially where they play a lesser role in transactions. Bearing some of the negative risk that 
is linked to investments made by managers, employee output has been intermittently referred 
to as “human capital”.36 Noted by Margaret Blair, this follows that employees, together with 
shareholders are most likely to be “residual claimants”, harbouring some of the liability from 
those who internalise excessive corporate risk.37 As these are made in highly specialized 
forms of employee ability, the role is essential to the longevity of the firm. The role of 
employees in corporate governance as a credible source of human capital is likely to be found 
across industry. Particular focus, however, can be placed on the service-oriented and 
technology reliant enterprises. Here, the intrinsic value of employees as prized labour 
emanates from the ability to innovate, provide specialize services, and customize on a mass 
                                                          
35 Fauver, L. & Fuerst, M. E., 2006. Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 82(1), pp. 673-716 
 
36 Blair et  al., op. cit., p. 92 
37 Ibid. 
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scale. Where employees function as core participants in the stake-holding enterprise, the 
resources inputted will inevitably amass the negative risk associated with the company. By its 
very nature, the role of employees in this cycle awards them a “stake” in the enterprise, just 
as the risk is distributed and aligned amongst shareholders.38 Where highly specialized 
skillsets are sought, employees are more likely to ensure that company resources are 
efficiently deployed. “Human capital” viewed as being firm-specific is undoubtedly seen as 
necessary for wealth creation. Alluding to three kinds of evidence, we can show that workers 
are able to accumulate skills, indicative of the performance of the entire corporation given the 
right environment. This is aided by extended lengths of service, resulting in higher wages. 
Directly correlated with job tenure, worker development is expected to rise with increased 
experience. Higher wages may be construed as evidence that a worker’s role in corporate 
governance is enhanced by the increased time value associated with their employment. 
Turnover rates will typically fall, leaving workers secure in their role. The “human capital” 
will be as attractive to the firm as to workers engrossed within.  
 
The contract held between employee and employer is inherently at odds with employee rights 
to access the products of their labour. Seen as a contract through which to hire voluntarily, 
once a person is legally employed via an employment contract, they effectively are devoid 
from legal responsibility for the consequences of their actions, whether yielding positive or 
negative results. That obligation is typically assigned to the employer. The renting of capital 
on the other hand results in financial leverage; with the equivalent of securities trading the 
renting of capital multiplies the availability of equity capital. Similarly, the hiring of capital 
creates human leverage. Here, the multiple effects are on the employer, as if to state that the 
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results gained by an expanded workforce are the sole product of the employer. The apparent 
conflict between core responsibility and the employment process is an established legal norm. 
Through the employment contract, the corporation as a by-product of capitalism is 
transformed into an organization that is dominated by governance.  The same organization, 
however, is not yet viewed as democratic despite the implicit “consent of the governed” 
evident in the employment contract.39 Employees, in other words, are not able to distribute 
governance rights to the employer as their sole representative. Employing the social and 
political theories of Hobbes in this instance, we see the workers as alienated from their 
labour, with the right to govern their own activities threatened at the mercy of the employer. 
A reduced version of the contracting tradition, the argument in favour of applying democratic 
principles to the workplace is one which gains in plausibility. Once the democratic principle 
of equitable representation is realised in the ordinary workplace, so the employment contract 
gains more acceptance by the employed. It implies declaring the employment contract as void 
so long as the democratic right held by employees is alienated. Once the democratic principle 
is applied universally, workers become members of the company in which they work and not 
just treated as an ordinary worker. In effect, the employment relation is taken over by the new 
status as owner.40  
 
Equally, they will have a tendency to leverage de facto control, drawing on their “inside 
knowledge” of the enterprise as well as the awareness of their own stake in its success. 41  
Critics argue that workers are better placed to exercise judgement over the day-to-day 
operations of a firm than absentee shareholders. Monitoring management performance is also 
called into question here, highlighting a tension between worker autonomy and the acclaimed 
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p.163 
40 Ellerman, op. cit., p.221 
41 Ibid., p. 342 
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foresight held by management. The implications here are that internal stakeholders have 
preferred rights of ownership, perhaps to a greater extent than do their external counterparts. 
This, however, does not exclusively suggest that major stakeholders be given majority voting 
rights ahead of shareholders, nor should they be disenfranchised from a firm. What is called 
into question by these findings, however, surrounds our shared understanding of ownership 
and what it means to contracting parties. Closer examination is needed into the types of 
investment at risk in corporations where control is distributed unevenly across categories of 
stakeholder.   
 
Recognition amongst employees of the importance of information flows, and their existence 
at all levels of governance is vital to the success of an organization. The implications are that 
it is often inefficient for key decisions to be made only by management. Models of Japanese 
companies discussed in Aoki’s work captures this debate well.42 Highlighting that structured 
systems at work turn out favourably when there is either prevalent or negligible levels of 
uncertainty, Aoki shows that this is a common occurrence in the workplace. At intermediate 
levels, however, efficient information flows gives workers the role to make some decisions as 
inefficient as possible.43 Whilst this hypothesis may appear as an unconventional 
interpretation of organizational governance, Gregory Jackson’s interjections provide some 
support.44 Using information to appear inefficient by some stakeholder groups does, however, 
make others appear more reactive to unusual circumstances or shocks specific to the 
workplace. The problem of negating employee efficiency has also been modelled. Increases 
in information flows from management to entry-level employees could result in concessions 
during crisis, steering troubled enterprises away from bankruptcy. Increasing flows outside 
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Tokyo: Oxford University Press, p. 303 
43 Ibid.,  p.32 
44 Jackson, G., 2007Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity. 1st ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 211 
Candidate Number: F1015 
23 
 
the traditional corporate hierarchy, establishing open forums for negotiation, and motivating 
employees to longer-term loyalty to the firm have been presented as possible solutions.45 
Aside from hypothetical conjecture, these plausible solutions have worked in practice. 
Collective voice in the corporation has been maintained, allowing the enterprise to function 
during economic grievances. A definitive goal of the National Labor Relations Act, 
employers of large corporations were to give their subordinates more than the statutory 
requirements.46 Relations between the board, senior management and the labour force altered 
significantly after the passage of the Act, creating a more cooperative decision-making 
process. 
 
Financial reporting, together with the voluntary or mandatory disclosure of information, is an 
aspect of governance that has the ability to make a difference to the ordinary citizen. 
Disclosure of information is identified as a means of holding the company responsible for 
failures in accountability. Internal information on the reputation of a company and how the 
governance model adopted will secure a good position for stakeholders.  Making information 
available in the public domain helps to create a system more responsive to the plight affecting 
the corporation, employees and stakeholders. It will allow the enterprise to arrive at a clearer 
understanding of stakeholder’s expectations. Corporate entities will be more capable to make 
astute decisions, once equipped with better information. In a review of corporate social and 
environment reporting practices, authors including Robert Gray discover a trend towards 
enhanced social reporting requirements.47 With the USA spearheading the move towards 
greater accountability to stakeholders, reporting on socially responsible issues grew more 
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widespread from the 1970s.  Voluntary reporting, however, is likely to be more limited in 
scope and will inevitably be biased to information portraying companies more favourably.  
 
This discussion, then, calls for greater investigation to be undertaken in relation to board 
structures accommodating employees. It remains a recurrent feature that collective employee 
interest is largely unrepresented on boards. Neither a legal requirement applied universally 
nor a precondition of corporate governance, the emerging trend calls for greater inclusion. 
Through the practice of codetermination in parts of Western Europe, there is less reluctance 
enshrined by law to exclude employees from boards, with the supervisory and management 
committees providing oversight to the operations of the labour force. Shareownership is a 
material option for employees to assume a greater role within the corporation. However, 
statistics show that the levels of representation differ widely in jurisdictions. A more reliable 
indicator of involvement stems from the perception of employees as human capital, where the 
value is closely related to performance. Finally, as carriers of information, employees take on 
a largely transferable role, navigating through the corporate hierarchy with the aim of 
delivering operational and strategic solutions. 
Chapter 3: Stakeholder Relations with a Focus on Employees’ Role 
 
Discourse on stakeholder relations questions the role of corporate governance in smoothing 
relations between the controlling participants, namely the employees, managers, investors, 
customers and suppliers of a firm. This chapter considers the views of stakeholders as a party 
asserting their interest in the enterprise, multiple self-interests that may not always be 
aligned. Rather these may be conflicting. Unlike investors in large companies, for examples, 
employees may be keen to assert their role as owners. This goal may be fulfilled as a result of 
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long-term cooperation with colleagues and other internal stakeholders. Deconstructing 
ownership values gives way to an unbundling of rights that are separate from each other and 
may be dispersed amongst the remaining stakeholders. With a focus on the separate 
ownership of rights, we suggest that employees do have the option of assuming a role as 
property owners, with this distancing them from the privileges accorded to other stakeholder 
groups. Developments in relation to stockholding employees, however, do not lead to an 
automatic rejection of the shareholder primacy model. It merely suggests that the nature of 
employee relations requires further investigation. Managers also contend their acclaimed role 
as legitimate stakeholders. Their stake at the alleged centre of the corporate governance 
system is to be explored through their association as stakeholders. They may try to control 
participants by supporting and limiting interactions in the organization. As salaried 
employees, they should be held accountable and closely scrutinized for actions on behalf of 
the firm.  Finally, stakeholder theory will be explored for its contributions, with the overlap 
into the discipline of stakeholder management deemed as an important contribution to 
existing literature on stakeholder relations. Legislation in the form of ‘stakeholder statutes’ 
will be seen as credible measures helping to shorten the distance between constituents, 
significantly aided through dialogue and active communication within and outside the 
boardroom.  
 
I. Employee and Managerial Power 
 
In opposition to the demands made by controlling shareholders in the largest corporations, 
employees seem to fulfil requests for ownership through commitment and extended 
participation. Whilst stakeholders appear to be motivated by differing interests, fragmented 
stakes in the corporation do not necessarily lead to a rejection of the shareholder primacy 
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model. Supported by Lucian A. Bebchuk, this argument indicates that the limitations of 
stakeholder importance require further research, especially into the position of employees 
within.48 Rights to existing employment, and compensation for losses in job tenure may seem 
to be of worthy consideration as vehicles for the bundle of rights associated with employee 
protection. However, the narrow focus on stakeholder rights to participation, as maintained 
by corporate governance scholars, is clearly distinct and separate from those distributed 
amongst customers, suppliers and creditors. There is some irony in alleging that the 
stakeholder model could be justified on the grounds of property holding, where ownership is 
equated with stakeholder legitimacy. The suggestion that property rights complements the 
shareholder primacy argument, contrasts markedly with more current trends arguing that the 
property ownership should be directed to stakeholders at the lower end of the hierarchy. This 
trend, ever present in the works of Honore, Coase and more recently by Munzer counters the 
arguments that private property rights cater solely for existing owners.49 Bargaining for the 
remainder of stakeholders who are not owners does not account for the position of 
employees. 
 
The key characteristics underpinning the central theories of distribution also bear relevance to 
corporate stakeholder. Referred to extensively, the notion of stakeholder as participant in 
distributive rights is well conceived.50 Where the “stake” of employees adheres to those 
maintaining successful operations in the long run, this “stake” is essentially founded on 
effort. Upon comparisons to other stakeholders, we see that the community, for example, is 
motivated more by needs for a sound external environment. Reduced levels of pollution or 
requests for strong civic infrastructures will take precedence over the acquisition of capital 
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through hostile takeover bids, for example. On a similar note, the stakes held by customers 
could be based on offers of enhanced protection rights in the market offering. Others making 
a more radical assertion would state that stakes “extending to the wider society” are not far 
removed from formal property rights, in line with critiques of corporate governance 
arrangements.51 If this is correct, a factor that would be needed to show this as an accurate 
development would recognize stake-holding groups as having a plural interest in the affairs 
of the corporation.  
 
Evidence shows that corporate governance appears to be an evolving, rather than static 
system, with managers at the centre. Whilst managers can be seen as controlling stakeholders, 
others are deemed as guiding and supporting interactions within the workplace.52 Managerial 
power will continue to be exercised through the forming of entry and exit barriers, using 
enforcement measures to oversee corporate structures, or even by initiating acquisitions and 
takeovers. As salaried employees, managers inform suppliers by developing additional 
streams of supply, for example through purchasing and price monopoly agreements. As key 
stakeholders falling under the category of employees, managers influence the external 
community by manipulating information available to the public. This may extend to the state 
through lobbying and campaigning exercises. Commentators including Michael Jensen go as 
far as to state that management influence of stakeholders is the dominant approach.53 The 
strategies employed by managers in order to manipulate stakeholders may appear as value in 
the short run; however this asymmetry of power disperses amongst other stakeholder groups 
in the long run.  In response to this, some constituents may develop their own 
counterstrategies in an attempt to repel the influence of managers. For example, they make 
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use of the same former enforcement schemes, but through institutional structures such as 
labour and consumer unions, and advisory associations. 54 
 
External stakeholders outside the corporation also try to change the behaviour of managers. 
With regards to financial institutions, these may attempt to exert influence on managerial 
action by threatening proxy fights. Events that occur when stockholders oppose one or many 
aspects of corporate governance, these will inevitably focus on managerial and directorial 
positions. Corporate activists could also attempt to influence shareowners through proxy 
votes.55 These could be executed in the hope of replacing management for a more responsive 
workforce. Once management is engaged in a proxy fight, however, the balance of power lies 
with them over the groups attempting to enforce corporate change. As a result, the 
mechanism of displacing the stakeholder group is unchanged.  External stakeholders outside 
the corporate may also try to change the behaviour of managers. With regards to financial 
institutions, these may attempt to exert influence on managerial action by threatening proxy 
fights.56 Events that occur when stockholders oppose one or many aspects of corporate 
governance, these will inevitably focus on managerial and directorial positions. Corporate 
activists could attempt to influence shareowners through proxy votes. This could be executed 
in the hope of replacing management for a more responsive workforce. Stakeholder theory 
can be seen as managerial in a broad sense. The term does not only summarize existing 
conflicts between employees, of which managers are categorized. Rather, it explains and 
forwards structures, practices, and attitudes that can be seen to form the bulk of stakeholder 
management. The requirement is applicable for all persons responsible for effecting corporate 
policy, which includes the government, shareowners as well as managers. The theory does 
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not instantly presume that managers are the apex of corporate governance and control. The 
lack of attention drawn to stakeholder interests does not fully resolve the problem of 
evaluating their stake in the firm. Nor does the theory imply that stakeholder groups should 
be involved equally in workplace decisions and processes. 
 
Opinions surrounding stakeholder theory have been presented in literature as a key distinction 
from stakeholder management. In contrast to this, a central tenet of stakeholder theory 
identifies the legitimate groups or persons participating in firm activity. 57 Each group 
contributes for the sake of their own interests; the legitimacy of the alternate interest does not 
become self-evident. Firstly identifying the stakeholders of a corporation, the theory attempts 
to give priority to the expedient group. The difference between this theory and those 
pertaining to others in the firm, or what is known as the “going concern” according to Archie 
B. Carroll, is that the former on stakeholders intends to guide and explain the organizational 
structure of a company, one in which numerous players achieve multiple purposes, which are 
not always congruent.58 The stakeholder theory tends to be broad, with less emphasis on the 
particular. This is not to say, however, that the stakeholder concept is vacuous, rather it 
reaches further than the descriptive observations of an organization, and the role of 
stakeholders within.59 However, the questions raised in relation to our discussion are distinct 
from each other, and are based on different types of evidence and forms of appraisal.  A 
central thesis argues that stakeholder theory and its account for corporate governance is 
purely descriptive. The descriptive model of stakeholders provides an overall structure, or 
framework, for examining empirical claims, where insights into the stakeholder concept are 
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laid down clearly, but assumptions relating to standards, approaches, or norms are not 
explicitly tested. The purely descriptive approach to testing the role of stakeholder 
participant, however, does not benefit from the same recognition as the “instrumental” 
theory.60 This form realises an approach for forming connections between stakeholder 
management practices and achieving corporate goals in terms of performance, for example 
through profitability, growth, stability and productivity within the firm. Whilst both the 
descriptive and normative approaches involve the key acceptance of the intrinsic and 
legitimate interests, the instrumental component leans more towards a normative argument. 
Each stakeholder group merits consideration not only for furthering the interests of 
shareholders, but for their value as a key input to the firm.  
 
As a damage limitation exercise, the adapting of techniques from existing stakeholder 
management practices is well received by participants and critics alike.  Bringing the intrinsic 
uses into the corporation has often been described as an enlightened form of self-interest. 61 
From the perspective of stakeholder management, as a discipline, the corporation can be 
presented as a joint effort of diverse and multiple interests and constituencies. The 
stakeholder view blends together employee relationships with a firm’s resources, industry 
counterparts and social environment into a unified analytical framework. From this, the 
wealth of an organization can be enhanced, through relationships with actors other than 
employees.62 Stakeholder connections with customers and suppliers, resource providers, and 
the local community are key to effective stakeholder management.63 In other words, the 
managing of relations between stakeholders, for the sake of mutual benefit, is central to 
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corporate success. Corporate leaders advocating an era of progressive stakeholder 
management, list the value of responding intelligently to the concerns of employees, as well 
as that of the general public. Allowing directors to sense and take advantage of new 
opportunities and anticipating problems before they arise. Since communication is an 
essential component of a successful corporation, stimulating change within the corporate 
hierarchy and equipping employees with the tools to further corporate objectives, dialogue 
needs to continue with all stakeholders not only to restore confidence, but also to relieve 
pressure on the company, shareholders and employees. Whilst directors need to function in 
the collective interests of shareowners, they should also account for the interests of other 
stakeholders. Accountability and transparency, whilst invaluable for effective leadership, 
should be balanced with the acceptance of all stakeholders, with equal recognition distributed 
amongst employees according to seniority. Balancing this entails a bargaining process 
involving participants, which should ideally be completed well in advance of completion. 
With a positive outcome, trust is enhanced between the firm and internal stakeholders. From 
a stakeholder perspective, corporate governance provides a mechanism for sustaining this 
balance.  
 
II. The Rise of Stakeholder Statutes with Reference to Employees’ Place 
 
Over time, the law has progressively made allowances for corporate decision making, 
beginning an enduring process that accounts for corporate decision making. Nearly all 
jurisdictions have enacted laws dictating executive directors to consider the interests of 
stakeholders without breach of their fiduciary obligations. According to Kathleen Hale, 
protecting shareholders through statutes alone cannot enhance stakeholder consideration seen 
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in the corporation.64 With influence increasing over stakeholder groups, the law has enshrined 
the practice of declaring the stakeholder as legitimate constituents holding the balance of 
power.65 A secondary purpose of the statutes is to prevent employees, including managers, to 
act against shareholders’ interests. The aim of enacting legislation, moving apace in the 
1980s, has been disputed. Whilst Kathleen Hale maintains the former argument, Testy states 
that the developments were made for the sake of managers.66 As employees, they needed a 
reason to prevent hostile takeovers that were more beneficial to shareholders. As the 
controllers began to use a discourse relevant to their group of stakeholders, supervisors could 
justify a repudiation of a “premium bid and thereby remain in control of their enterprise (and 
their jobs).”67 Conceding that there had to be a reason why executives rapidly welcomed its 
passage, the statutes were likely to be used for the sake of self-interest rather than an 
intentional duty of care.68 With the sole exception of Connecticut, no state in the 1980s 
obliged leaders to consider stakeholders with much worth, and certainly did not expect 
administrators to act on their behalf.69 Whilst traditional arguments convey stakeholder 
statutes as enactments that disrupt shareholder wealth maximization, others declare that such 
statutes are a clear violation of the Fifth Amendment, which forbids takings “on an unfair 
basis.”70 This precondition does not appear constitutionally sound, as the manner of takings 
presently is often misconstrued by relevant parties; however this clause does suggest the early 
reaction to shareholdings acquired. If the shareholder primacy norm was to be relaxed, 
further constraints such as the need to generate a surplus of capital, together with market 
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pressures would mean a retuning back to the norm. Unlike the majority of stockholders in 
large companies, employees appear to express ownership in the corporation through extent of 
commitment and long-term participation.71 Where federal government has a constitutional 
right to seize ownership, expressed in the form of property for public use, the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the payment of fair compensation, 
equal to current market value, to the proprietor.72 The wider group of persons with a 
controlling interest in the enterprise may have differing interests; however, the breakup of 
ownership in the modern corporation is not likely to lead to an instant rejection of 
shareholder primacy. Rather, it suggests that the emerging trend requires greater 
consideration.  
 
A further variation evident in stakeholder statutes is the extent to which they extend 
permission to consider salaried employees outside of the board of directors. The issue as to 
whether workers at the grassroots level should be granted equal consideration remains 
undecided. Wyoming’s current statute, for example, notes plainly that a director “may also 
consider...the interests of the corporation’s suppliers, creditors and customers.”73 This piece 
of legislation omits the classification of officers as corporate stakeholder. Illinois extends this 
further by reporting that directors and officers ought to account for the input of stakeholder 
groups.74 But if the intention of the statute is to allow consideration by directors and officers, 
then both sets should be included, with the role of officers more clearly stated. The absence 
of employees from statutory language, whilst still relevant, does not facilitate the decision-
making process as easily as may have been in favour of stakeholders. In contrast, stakeholder 
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consideration is allowed only during takeover or situations where change of control takes 
place. Held in nineteen states, this requirement is less inclusive of employee recognition. 
 
Given that stakeholder statutes, admittedly, have done little to close the gap between salaried 
directors, managerial employees, and ordinary workers, the successive passage of legislation 
should not be dispelled for its failure to adequately account for all employees. Rather, they 
ought to be seen as a foundation upon which further revisions can be made to the laws 
encompassing stakeholder rights. Hale argues that a development that could be furthered, in 
addition to successive legislation, is seen in statutes pertaining to meetings.75 Stakeholder 
meeting requirements, Hale states, would enforce corporate leaders with an obligation to hold 
periodic meetings with internal and external stakeholder groups.76 The express purpose of 
these would be to limit the distance and, in effect, create a more earnest consideration of 
stakeholders during boardroom deliberations. Individual states could dictate how often the 
meetings should be held. Using further evidence, we can see the strengths of dialogue and 
discussion amongst stakeholder participants and their superiors at all stages of the decision-
making process.77 This would ensure a greater inclusivity in the workplace. Issues brought to 
the regular meetings would range from compliance with accounting practices to the issuing of 
employee bonuses. Other topics such as introducing new health and safety standards 
highlight a need to move away from purely discussing contractual changes in ownership, with 
more reliance instead upon the resizing of corporate objectives. On the other hand, by 
limiting meetings to changes in control, leaders within the corporation will expose the 
absence of stakeholder consideration. That employees and other groups should be fully 
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accounted for and granted, once agreed upon in the boardroom, should be practiced 
throughout.78 
 
We witness, then, a realignment of interests between employees and stakeholder counterparts. 
Employees continue to have a controlling interest in firm output; however the extent of their 
efforts is strongly contested by their supervisors. Alleged to be manipulating their rights as 
managers, it has been argued that they should equally be considered as stakeholder. 
Corporate governance scholars maintain that stakeholder participation rights have narrowed 
in focus. They focus less on the roles of key stakeholders in contractual arrangement with the 
firm and more on their exclusive relations with stakeholders within the firm. This network of 
relationships is built on by a series of implicit agreements where each group attempts to 
secure the most favourable results. The stakeholder view of corporate governance uses a 
system where a balance of interest is maintained. This may involve a complex bargaining 
process which needs to be ongoing. Once this continuum is achieved, trust can be secured 
throughout the firm and external stakeholders, of which the community plays a key role.  
Initially introduced by the passage of stakeholder statutes, communication is also clearly 
favoured. Dialogue between participants enables the corporation to reduce tension and relieve 
constituents from obligations imposed by superiors at the top of the corporate hierarchy. 
Chapter 4: Regulatory Responses to the Stakeholders Governance Gap 
 
Empirical evidence points towards the self-regulation of corporate entities as an ineffective 
means of governance. Stakeholders, it is suggested, are unable to receive a fair and equitable 
treatment from employers who dictate their own mechanisms of governance. Unless entities 
are explicitly connected to corporate culture, and employee commitment is actively sought, 
                                                          
78 Stone, K. V. W., 1991. Employees as Stakeholders under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes. Stetson 
Law Review, 22(6), p. 45. 
Candidate Number: F1015 
36 
 
companies will yield insignificant results as a result of poor governance. One means through 
which employee commitment is encouraged by law is through the creation and maintenance 
of the employment contract. Workers can either be satisfied through this written agreement, 
as enshrined by law, or they can view the contract as a tool for alienation. Utilising social 
contract theory helps us to identify the line between regulators, lawmakers, and the governed, 
whom in this case would be the employee. Further, the regulatory tool of compliance 
management has been received ambiguously. Some quarters write that the technique is 
successful in securing a preferred mode of governance only once a favourable environment is 
maintained. This excerpt focuses on the regulatory and social conditions amongst which 
corporations exist and the challenges they face in achieving self-regulation.  The issue of 
responsibility is also examined for its relevance to internal and external stakeholders, with 
perceptions of the term applied in different contexts. Finally, disclosure as a means of social 
reporting will be discussed in order to arrive at a clearer understanding of the company’s role 
towards its stakeholders, from the regulatory point of view. 
 
I. The “Open Corporation” and Compliance Programmes 
 
Modes of corporate regulation that are most commonly accepted by scholars and practitioners 
involve the placing of stakeholders into an influential position, where they are able to input 
their views to corporate management. Christine Parker states that this development also 
implies the nature of regulatory enforcement, facilitated by law, as one that ought to allow the 
movement of companies into three distinct phases.79 Prescriptive regulation aimed at 
corporations has reached a crisis. Involving entities that are unable to facilitate changes to 
working culture via restructuring, Parker suggests that the most viable means of securing 
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transformation is through adopting self-governance practices. Prompting issues of 
responsibility through self-governing modes of regulation, this is aimed at the second phase, 
where companies report on the changes they have introduced. Enabling regulatory authorities 
and stakeholders to check that self-regulation is necessary, it is the responsibility of 
stakeholders to constantly evaluate changes to corporate structures, together with their 
outcomes and effects. With the empirical findings largely a result of qualitative fieldwork 
carried out by practitioners in Australia, Europe, and the USA, we are shown the variations of 
regulatory systems and their impact on governance. In certain instances, these have occurred 
with modest success.80 Selznick takes a more ‘pragmatic’ approach, by relying on empirical 
evidence to show the nature of corporate systems.81 Regulatory reform resulting in innovation 
and redesign to the ways in which employees are accounted for also calls into question the 
acceptance of responsibility by the corporation. Management of these responsibilities have 
been scrutinized in recent years for their impact on stakeholders. As part of the “open 
corporation”, a description of governance elaborated on by Christine Parker, the management 
of corporate responsibility shows an underlying commitment to respond to government 
initiatives via self-regulation.82 This includes a realization of purpose by the organization and 
its approach to stakeholders, together with the on-boarding of the requisite skills and 
knowledge. Here, professionals take on a central role in facilitating engagement between 
upper management and stakeholders to form the “open corporation”, where interaction 
between stakeholders, the firm, and regulators, is encouraged.83 These phases will follow in 
succession so as to avoid conflict and create a more robust system. For this arrangement to 
work however, it needs to be included as an integral part of corporate responsibility, as 
recognised by outside bodies. Whilst external regulatory pressure is key, studies point 
                                                          
80 Selznick, P., 1969. Law Society and Industrial Justice. 12th ed. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Press,   
p. 309 
81 Ibid. 
82 Parker, op.cit, p. 49 
83 Ibid., p. 68. 
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towards the equal significance of internal compliance. In evaluating the US handling of the 
Cooperative Compliance Programme taking place between 1981 and 2004, we find that 
professionalism in the field of safety management was crucial for effective compliance with 
regulatory goals.84 Labour-management forums were set up on six sites to tackle the goals of 
reform. The approach of the Programme mainly succeeded due to the strengthening of safety 
initiatives in ways that traditional strategies had failed. The style of launching voluntary 
safety programs by those recently promoted in the organization led to better implementation 
and oversight by senior management. 
 
II. Approaches of the Financial Services Authority and Implications 
 
As a means of avoiding the limits of industry self-regulation, greater agreement needs to be 
reached amongst beneficiaries. Including regulators, the corporate entity itself and 
stakeholder, of which we will continue to focus on employees, the success of self-regulation 
depends on the willingness of each group to comply.85 A desire to comply with the new 
system of regulation must not avoid a complete rejection of the traditional mode; rather the 
inefficiencies of the existing framework will be focused on and expelled. If individuals and 
entities are to comply with regulations, the rules to be enforced fairly must be prior 
established. Trust in demands placed on employees to comply, and concerns in violating this 
is a central issue for regulators. This has led some scholars questioning the need for a more 
collaborative approach to regulation, with beneficiaries given access to participation and 
greater inclusion.86 This approach to compliance management, however, does not wholly 
engage with the opinions and concerns voiced by employees. Prescriptive rules stipulated by 
                                                          
84 Rees, J., 2010. Reforming the Workplace. 4th ed. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, p. 67 
85 Clarkson, M. B., 1995. A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social 
Performance. The Academy of Management Review, 26(1), p. 108. 
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Candidate Number: F1015 
39 
 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK on Senior Management, Arrangements, 
Systems and Control, all approve delivery by persons in controlled functions. This is relevant 
for all employees assuming titles under the Approved Persons Regime.87 This technique of 
“command and control” thus highlights the impossibility for regulators to be solely 
responsible for the mismanagement of corporate issues. It is simply not achievable for 
authorities to avoid every dispute between personnel. Neither would a common standard 
force businesses to be more accountable for their actions. Their scrutiny of compliance as an 
effective tool for integration may result in prolonged disagreement. Negative experience will 
dissuade employees from accepting the rules enforced on them, just as executives question 
the effectiveness of reforms imposed on the enterprise by regulators.88 There is no bond 
convincing either party that compliance with all reforms to stakeholder governance is 
worthwhile. Rather, employees and other groups will be concerned with self-regulation and 
the entity’s ability to connect with the individual bearing that legitimate interest, the 
effectiveness of corporate self-regulation ultimately depends on the strength of connection 
with stakeholders, internal and external to the organization. Viewed as both a “top-down” and 
a “bottom-up” approach to governance, broader association with organizational ethics poses 
further limits. 89 As with existing forms of social regulation, the “command and control” 
technique, this has been expressed by Anthony Ogus as one “in which standards, backed by 
criminal sanctions are imposed on suppliers”.90 This definition does not, however extend 
liability to those acts that may be committed “not in good faith”.91 The activity of individual 
actors within organizations is largely determined by their environment. As employees are 
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hired to fulfil employer’s requests, they are also at liberty to use their resources in order to 
pursue their own corporate interests. 
 
In sum, we see a move towards greater inclusion of stakeholders. Through self-regulation, 
companies are able to determine how a corporation should be run and in whose interest. The 
evidence suggests that there are multiple factors at play, with existing tensions between 
regulators and corporate governance participants. What remains constant, however, is the 
desire of stakeholders to access rights to the corporation on a near equivalent basis with their 
employers. Views of the company as a wholly social enterprise do not hold. Disclosure of 
information and social reporting has not been evidenced by corporations throughout the 
world. Rather, it points to a recognised need for more socially responsible behaviour. Issues 
affecting the organization, similarly, do not focus exclusively on the financial markets in 
which they operate. The effect of corporate output has been called into question by the move 
towards a corporate democracy, with the main impact seen on workers.   
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
Our discussion on the role of employees in corporate governance has presented us with 
interesting issues that need to be more fully explored. Where Chapter 1 begins our discussion 
by introducing the topic and themes to be analysed in greater depth, Chapter 2 began with the 
rights of employee representation on boards of directors. We have shown that workers can 
and do participate upon election to the board, where they are in a position to influence senior 
management on their grievances and make sure that resources are deployed in their favour. 
Greater employee participation improves dialogue in the corporation, avoiding conflicts of 
interest and safeguarding those of shareholders. Board representation calls into question the 
concept of ownership, where employees are able to have a material presence on boards as 
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shareholders. Companies owned by employees are a more effective way to dictate structures 
of corporate governance. However, this presence has been argued as a rarity, with findings 
pointing towards this framework as inefficient. Despite equity ownership becoming more 
common a feature in the workplace, equity owned by employees is heavily biased towards 
the service sectors. As competent and technically efficient individuals at the ground level, it 
is expected that workers could lend their operational insight in boardroom discussions, basing 
this on genuine experience and productivity. The issue of codetermination has been explored, 
with favourable models of corporate governance found in Germany. Employee representation 
is legally mandated, with the requirement for greater cooperation matched by strategic 
improvements in governance. Through works councils, employee ownership is concentrated 
upon as an effective form of pressure against traditional modes of governance. As a potent 
source of “human capital”, employees will have an ability to control operations, drawing 
upon their specialist knowledge and questioning management techniques. Information flows 
are facilitated by a reliance on employees as carriers of information. Upon efficient 
exchanges of this information, transfers between stakeholder groups will make internal and 
external participants more reactive to unusual activity. 
 
A complementary view on property as a sound basis for the stakeholder model of governance 
has also been shown. Holding a “stake” in the enterprise is compared to employee status as 
proprietor, both in terms of their physical and psychological presence in the workplace and 
their material ownership of the company’s stock. As both parties compete for hegemony, the 
debate on stakeholder versus shareholder interests poses a distinct dilemma for the enterprise. 
Whilst employees and shareholders are bestowed with different types of power, these must be 
utilised for the common good of the company, with neither party gaining excessive 
proprietorship at the expense of the other. Thus, there is a further conflict of interest between 
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the stakeholding group and the controlling shareholders, leading to an undeveloped solution 
to the shareholder primacy model. Granted, the traditional position of shareholder, as a legal 
person who assumes overall control and direction through stockownership, exists in company 
governance. This trend transcends jurisdiction, providing a core infrastructure and guide as to 
whom production should continue on behalf of. Whilst conflicts could be reprised through 
greater realisation of fiduciary obligations to the firm, the stakeholder debate still calls into 
question the extent of involvement. Issues, for example, as to whether employee and 
shareholder interests should be viewed purely as a matter of consideration, rather than a basis 
for substantive reform. 
 
Extant research also highlights managers as having a controlling stake, once supervisory 
oversight is exercised. Stakeholder groups including customers, suppliers and workers may 
make use of enforcement schemes through consumer and labour unions, as well as trade 
associations. External stakeholders of the corporation may also try to alter management 
techniques. Here, we argue that managers should be considered as employees; their treatment 
as stakeholders is thereby justified. Managerial interests, for example, may meet those of 
other stakeholder groups to vote out the board, in the event of a hostile takeover. With job 
security threatened, employees and managers may be more closely aligned and will seek to 
join up. Relying on stakeholder theory in support of our findings, we see that managers 
should not by themselves be seen at the centre of corporate control.   The suggestion made in 
support of our discussion follows that stakeholders, regardless of their internality or 
externality to the corporation, ought to be treated equally during day-to-day activity and 
decision-making.  One way in which the law allows for decisions to be made is through the 
passage of stakeholder statutes. Successive statutes stipulating the rights of stakeholders 
include those of employees, maintain that their interests should be maintained without breach 
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of their fiduciary ties. A second function of stakeholder statutes is to block the ability of 
employees to act against the interests of shareholders. Whilst this has considerable 
advantages for the unity of the corporation, the purpose of these statutes may not always 
work in the favour of employees. This suggests that they are at odds with a system of 
corporate governance, one that is run solely on behalf of shareholders. The legislative 
passage in the United States has done little to close the gap between the board of directors 
and workers. 
 
We also turn to the regulatory framework facilitating corporate governance, and particularly 
the position of employees within. With empirical evidence suggesting that self-regulation is 
an inadequate form of stakeholder protection, the results have a sound basis for justification. 
Corporate self-regulation suggests that the responsibility to evaluate changes within corporate 
structures is left to internal participants. More evaluation of the response by regulators to 
imbalances in stakeholder protection is needed. The idea of the “open corporation”, where 
stakeholders can initiate change, is more than valid for its encouragement of greater 
transparency, accountability and disclosure of information. Obligations to comply with the 
new framework depend on a rejection of existing modes of governance, focusing instead on 
the ability of the corporation to connect to stakeholders. Once an effective dialogue is 
established, information flows are likely to become more efficient, resulting in a flat 
organization. Future research is likely to show in more depth the virtues of alternative models 
of governance. Whilst promoting employee input through a decentralization of decision-
making process assigns more responsibility, traditional barriers will be eroded. No longer will 
the traditional hierarchy follow a “top-down” approach. Governance structures are likely to 
vary, with a preference for a more streamlined organization where employees, as 
stakeholders, steer the organization towards greater inclusivity.  
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In response to the questions posed at the start of this discussion, we have found that the role 
of employees within the corporation is multifold. With increased presence in the boardroom, 
aided by legislative reform, employees have retained their corporate voice. Board structures 
vary globally, with certain economies more advanced in terms of inclusion than others. As a 
potent source of knowledge, their ability to transmit information is key to overall 
productivity. Their collaborative approach with other members of the corporation bodes well 
in classifying employees. This study has attempted to connect these diverse approaches, and 
has brought into focus the need to accept workers as legitimate stakeholders into the 
corporation. Not only do they feature as skilled participant; employees are beginning to 
emerge as leaders of a distinctly modern corporate governance movement. 
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